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**Validity of Common-Law Assignments for Benefit of Creditors.—**

The federal bankruptcy act suspended the Illinois statute in reference to voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors. In *Pogue v. Rowe*, 86 Northeastern Reporter, 207, it appeared that Clausen had made a common-law assignment of his stock of merchandise to Pogue. Another of Clausen's creditors, having secured a judgment against him, had a constable levy on the merchandise in P.'s possession. P. retook the goods under a writ of replevin. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that a common-law assignment for the benefit of creditors is valid as far as the statutes of the state are concerned, and that P. was entitled to the goods.

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**Right of Accused to Be Present at Rendition of Verdict.**—During his trial for a capital offense accused was on bail. When the jury brought in its verdict of manslaughter he was out in the country for the night. In *Sherrod v. State*, 47 Southern Reporter, 554, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that wherever the charge is capital the defendant cannot waive his right to be present, and whether he be in jail, subject to the power of the court to produce him, or on bond, it is fatal error to receive the verdict in his absence. This, although not a constitutional right, is one secured by statute and the common law. The conviction of manslaughter having been reversed, accused was discharged, as any further prosecution would have resulted in placing him twice in jeopardy for the same offense.

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**Second Trial In Eminent Domain as Subversive of Justice.**—A municipality instituted condemnation proceedings against a railroad corporation to enable it to extend an avenue across the right of way. The judgment for the railway was so large that the proceeding was abandoned by the municipality. Shortly thereafter it sought to extend another avenue just six inches south of the first one across the same track, and to have damages adjudicated by the court. In *Northern Pac. Ry. Co. et al. v. City of Georgetown*, 97 Pacific Reporter, 659, the Supreme Court of Washington held that to permit the second trial would not or y be subversive of justice, but would be making a farce of judicial proceedings, by allowing a litigant to play hide and seek with the judgment of a court by accepting such judgment, if it suited him, by rejecting it if it did not, and commencing another action involving the same issues, and so on ad infinitum, until he was satisfied with the result.

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**Waiver of Exemptions by Bankrupt.**—The Georgia Constitution forbids the waiver by a debtor of the right of exemption to wearing apparel and \$300 worth of household and kitchen furniture and provisions. In *Citizens' Bank v. Hargraves*, 164 Federal Reporter, 613,